The third important shift occurred in 2009, when the Ethiopians withdrew, creating a power vacuum that allowed al-Shabaab to return to semi-conventional battle and dominate a substantial portion of the country, including sections of Mogadishu. This period of dominance (2009-2010) provided al-Shabaab with remarkable success and huge advantages, such as the ICU or, on the other hand, a conventional military, which possibly harmed its adaptability fairly in the face of another transition of powers yet to be established. The third big shift occurred in 2011, with the establishment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Al-Shabaab was challenged by a Kenyan offensive (Operation Linda Nchi).

Even though the obstacles limited al-ability Shabaab to study, the group was eventually ready to overcome the obstacles and return to guerrilla warfare. To meet the requirements of the battlefield and modify techniques, Islamists anticipated overcoming authority barriers to change, including some that state military confront.

The Ethiopian Invasion is the first basic juncture. Before the attack in late December 2006, the dominant militant Islamist organization in Somalia was the ICU, a vast alliance of volunteer forces that included the youthful al-Shabaab. During this time, Islamists engaged in semi-conventional warfare.

They concentrated on area control and set-piece combat against the warlords, including the United States-backed Alliance for Harmony Restoration and Counter-Terrorism  The ICU cleared across Somalia with a series of large-scale raids, employing as many as 600 warriors and 50 "battle carts" or "technicals" (pickup trucks outfitted with mounted antiaircraft rifles and machine guns). ICU powers engaged in "savage firearm combat that left hundreds dead," crushing each warlord in turn. By June 5, they had triumphed and controlled the great bulk of the country, including Mogadishu.

The Ethiopian incursion drastically altered Somalia's power balance. While Islamists were more grounded than their native adversaries (the warlords), they couldn't equal Ethiopia's conventional military power, which had both greater preparedness and dominant weaponry. A pair of annihilating routs in "open, ordinary warfare" within seven days of one another demonstrated power imbalance. The major loss occurred on Daynunay (December 19-23), when the ICU could not counter the Ethiopian-mounted gun attacks. The second defeat occurred at Iidale (December 21-26), where ICU forces engaged in close-quarters combat and held out against Ethiopian tanks for a few days until Ethiopian helicopter gunships arrived and shattered ICU lines. For eight days of intense During regular battle, up to 1,000 ICU competitors were killed, and a further 3,000 were injured. These setbacks triggered the first emergency training for Somalia's Islamists since the "battle at Iidale had lately demonstrated that al-Shabaab could not win a head-to-head slugging match" against Ethiopian soldiers. However, the way Somalia's Islamist groups reacted showed the barriers to learning.

Indeed, even after these setbacks, Having demonstrated the futility of a standard technique, the ICU chose not to adopt a guerrilla methodology. All else being equal, the ICU and its united state army (the Muqawama, or "obstruction"), currently led by Abdulkadir Ali Omar, opted to confront the Ethiopians. ICU powers dug in, supporting their bases with supplies and waging a foolish and ultimately pointless drawn-out war for control of Mogadishu against Ethiopia's dominating military might. For a long period, the opposing forces exchanged practically constant mortar and rocket fire, as well as intermittent ground offensives, resulting in a huge number of casualties.

Nonetheless, despite the ICU's pledge that the city will not be handed up, Ethiopia stands to gain significantly in military weaponry rendering it an unwinnable battle According to one observer, the "Muqawama didn't have anything to shoot against the tank[s] except an AK-47, which was inadequate," limiting their ability to block Ethiopian offensives. As a result, by the end of 2007, Ethiopia had taken control of the city, and the ICU had been largely destroyed.

Some attribute the ICU's basic dormancy to the gathering's religious system, the character of its leaders, or its unknown patron. Despite the same mindset, the ICU and al-Shabaab used vastly different systems.

Furthermore, despite a shift in management from Sharif Sheik Ahmed to Omar, the ICU remained decisively stagnant, suggesting that the gathering's technique was flawed and cannot be attributed solely to the pioneer's propensity Finally, the Islamists' relations with global sponsors, notably Eritrea, became established only after the demise of the ICU when Eritrea assisted the former ICU pioneers in establishing the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia. As a result, unknown supporters most likely had a limited impact on the ICU's technique during the immediate aftermath of the Ethiopian invasion.

Overall, its collection of progress experiences and massive assets likely explains why the ICU (in contrast to al-Shabaab) remained focused on large-scale projects. Before the Ethiopian invasion, the ICU had achieved great success with unconventional warfare. This accomplishment logically increased the ICU's confidence in its ability to defeat the Ethiopians through massive-scale efforts, and Extremist fighting makes me quite hesitant. Furthermore, it is (main areas of strength for assets to faction and business volunteer armies) allowed it to refocus and commit to assisting large-scale actions. This extensive assistance network led the ICU administration to believe that their previous losses were due to a lack of assets rather than poor methods. This prompted them to continue challenging control of Mogadishu in the same way.

The more modest al-Shabaab, on the other hand, showed a more notable ability to adapt and adjust to the new skewed balance of powers. Despite its presence in Mogadishu Throughout 2007, "al-Shabaab was not a significant military entertainer" in the fighting; it refused to join in the assault for the capital. Instead, al-Shabaab abandoned conventional warfare and reinvented itself as an insurgency. For instance, in the "In the face of normal combat, al-Shabaab would retreat. [It] specialized in the hit-and-run and self-destruction attacks "and focused on high-profile scaremonger assaults to increase their reputation. While the ICU fought, and lost, against Ethiopia's overwhelming military might, al-Shabaab "methodically went after the gentler spots of public authority," focusing on government officials and anyone collaborating with the Ethiopians, while also launching quickly in and out assaults on Ethiopian forces. This move allowed al-Shabaab to flourish not only to get by not at all like the more grounded, though decidedly boring ICU moreover to thrive and turn become the primary opposition to Ethiopia before the end of the year.