A characteristic that is fundamental to al-worldview, Shabaab's the character of its commanders, unexpected patrons, or topography. Regardless, if their strategy had not been completely fixed in stone, the ICU and al-Shabaab would have fought in essentially the same way. Regardless of comparing ideas, al-Shabaab employed a distinctly distinct technique. Furthermore, this critical Change occurred as a result of the initiative of al-most Shabaab's noteworthy emir, Ayden Ayro, who also governed al-Shabaab throughout the major period of semi-conventional combat. The fact that this significant transformation occurred in the face of predicted authority indicates that the change was not caused by the pioneer's personality.

Furthermore, even though al-Shabaab had ties to worldwide sponsors, including Eritrea, its influence was limited. For example, in 2007, al-Shabaab refused to join an Eritrean-facilitated highest point for the creation of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (which it later denounced25) and agreed to pursue Eritrea.  As a result, the role of unknown donors appears to have been limited to monetary assistance rather than critical transportation from a faraway location. Eventually, Because geology usually impacts extremist meetings' practices, it provides little explanation for al-critical Shabaab's developments. Although the geology of al-Shabaab's battle has been consistent, its approach has evolved.

Others argue that al-Shabaab was part of the ICU, whose leadership assigned al-Shabaab the task of waging guerilla warfare while the ICU remained in Mogadishu. While intuitively plausible, this explanation ignores the deteriorating relationship between the two groups, which "had gone from horrible to worse more unfortunate even before Ethiopia's military engagement." As a result, al-Shabaab split from the ICU after the December 2006 fighting, and there were rumors of death deals between al-Shabaab and ICU leadership.

The two gatherings no longer had a traditional initiative at this time. Furthermore, as close observers showed, "al-Shabaab avoided massive battles and refused to negotiate with any Sharia Court soldiers."  As a result, far from being assigned guerrilla duty by ICU authorities, al-Shabaab was in defiance of ICU directives.

Another possible explanation is that al-Shabaab had the option of pursuing an extreme method since the ICU was the primary barrier against Ethiopian authorities. This was the case If the ICU had been destroyed in mid-to-late 2007, al-Shabaab would have been forced to take its place and fight Ethiopia more conventionally. However, this did not materialize, and despite the ICU's defeat, which pushed al-Shabaab into the position as the primary opposition to Ethiopia by late 2007, al-Shabaab continued to use an insurgency strategy until Ethiopia began its retreat in late 2008. This essential consistency on the part of al-Shabaab, regardless of its changed status as the resistance to Ethiopian powers, demonstrates that what caused (and permitted) it to use an extremist strategy was not its auxiliary status to the ICU, but rather its essential adaptability in the face of adversity overcoming a usual foe

·         Al-rise Shabaab's insurgency demonstrated its basic flexibility, which may be attributed in part to the absence of impediments. In contrast to the ICU, al-Shabaab had no set of progress experiences.

·         According to Mukhtar Robow, a senior al-Shabaab pioneer, the organization was formed in August 2006.

·         As a result, it lacked experience in large-scale battles. The setbacks at Daynunay and Iidale in mid-2007 were the most significant clashes in which al-Shabaab had participated. As a result, the authorities had not seen any victories that would have led them to believe that a system of large-scale battles might be effective. In addition, unlike the ICU, al-Shabaab required asset holdings. As of mid-2007, it consisted of " a couple of hundred fighters." As a result, the labor supply was required to accept that future large-scale battles might finish differently if more soldiers and equipment were invested.

·         As a result, unlike the ICU, al-Shabaab had no reason to believe that a system of large-scale battles could defeat Ethiopia, making it easier for al-Shabaab to shift to an inherently fanatical system.

·         The Ethiopian Withdrawal is the second crucial juncture. Following Ethiopia's withdrawal in January 2009, the balance of power shifted once more. Al-Shabaab grew to become "without a doubt the most powerful force in southern Somalia."

·         reverted to a semi-conventional warfare strategy that emphasized larger-scale battles and territorial control. This critical transition was visible in al-organization, Shabaab's which centered on the Jabhat ("armed force"), organized for large-scale actions, and included divisions of 300 officers furnished with battle carts.

·         Furthermore, this organizational shift coincided with a critical shift in al-tasks. Shabaab While it had previously only used hidden restricted scope activities, al-Shabaab has lately begun to maneuver massive forces in the open.

·         Its capture of the vital port city of Merca required "hundreds" of fighters, while its triumph in Hudur in February 2009 required 800 to 1,000 fighters.

According to Bohumil Dobos, the "nature of the dispute in the following stage was closer to typical combat; al-Shabaab was aiming to overpower the land, as seen by its efforts to have large segment and financial hubs." Whereas before al-Shabaab had fled despite conventional engagement with pro-government forces, it showed a freshly discovered readiness to participate in long-term conflict during this era.  In August, al-Shabaab seized Kismayo after "3 days of heaviest warfare" with government forces, which resulted in 90 deaths and over 200 injuries. This critical transition came to an end on May 7, 2009, when al-Shabaab launched an offensive to take control of Mogadishu. The magnitude of this action AMISOM A Ugandan officer walks through an old steel manufacturing line in Mogadishu while carrying a 120mm mortar round used by al-Shabaab, on August 15, 2011 (United Nations/Stuart Price).

·         Early to mid-2006 Semiconventional combat is advantageous. Victory

·         Late 2006-2009 Negative Insurgency (change) Survive

·         2009-2010 Semiconventional combat is advantageous (change) Unfavorable Semiconventional fighting in 2011 (no change)

Routs \s2011-present Negative Insurgency (change) Surviving was not typical for anything the Islamists had done during the Ethiopian rule when they relied primarily on little operations. On the other hand, this hostile was massive, with 6,000 to 7,000 contenders and several fight carts. Even though the authorities "advertised not a great cause... [in terms of the attack's time] The reasons were plain: with the Ethiopians gone, AMISOM limited to security, and the TFG [Transitional Administrative Government] a shambles, this would be their most obvious opportunity to overrun Mogadishu and grab control." 

This critical change was successful, and al-Shabaab "pushed aside the authority government to become the country's true ruler." It eventually controlled more than 80% of Somalia south of Puntland, including a large portion of the country's oil reserves. Mogadishu — and, in any case, 3,000,000 Somalis. This period of growth via semi-conventional combat (2009-2010) substantially influenced the al-hierarchical Shabaab's structure and capacity as a learning organization, giving it a few credits of a conventional armed force that included a history of advance through semi-conventional fighting. Moreover, at this time, al-Shabaab inferred up to USD 100 million in charge of revenue and had a big number of newcomers (enlarging its positions to 13,00043 or 14,000 fighters), providing it with huge assets. Each of these factors (common to all state militaries) hampered al-ability Shabaab to function as a learning organization and move forcefully in 2010-2011.