On August 23, 1946, US State Division Partner Head of Close to Eastern Undertakings John D. Jernegan prepared a notice, which was supported by Secretary Byrnes and Undersecretary Acheson on October 21, 1946, stating that the Soviet Union planned to debilitate Turkey to overwhelm it and use it both as a guard against possible external assault from the Mediterranean and as a device for the political and military venture into the Mediterranean and the Center East. Turkey's position in the Cold War became clearer in this release. As it stands, Turkey's strategic location in the Middle East, as well as its decision to defy Soviet pressure (which is fully supported by the United States and the United Kingdom), would serve as an important reference for other Middle Eastern countries. In the event of a confrontation, Turkey would be viewed as a typical impediment to the Soviet Union's expansion into the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

As previously stated, Turkey's international region was considered essential for Soviet domination during the Cold War years. Control of the Waterways was, without a doubt, the raison d'être of American main initiatives in the region. Around that time, President Harry Truman viewed George Kennan's admonitions in the "Long Telegram," which claimed that the US should pursue a "control" approach to halt Soviet growth.

In this system, the primary substantive proof of American involvement in Turkey can be found in Acheson's explanations, providing Turkey with a secret assurance that Soviet regional requests extended into "circles of world harmony and security," in which the US was "very interested." Similarly, Loy Henderson, Overseer of the Express Division's Near East and African Undertakings, considered Turkey to be "the main military calculate the eastern Mediterranean and Center East," adding that "by its geological position, Turkey is the plug in the neck of the container through which Soviet political and military impact could most truly flow into the eastern Mediterranean and Center East." Acheson also stated that "the West needed to keep Greece and Turkey out of Soviet hands - or be prepared to accept the resultant loss of the Center East's crucial bases, lines of communication, and assets." These remarks might be seen as underlying indicators of Turkey's condition in the region's new American international discourse.

The English government then declared on February 21, 1947, that it was withdrawing its troops from Greece and completing its military and monetary guide to Greece and Turkey. Without US backing, the US group said in Congress, Greece would be taken over by socialists, Turkey would be weak in the district, and the eastern Mediterranean and the Near East would fall under Soviet dominance. On March 12, 1947, President Harry Truman addressed Congress and made one of the most important addresses of the postwar period, requesting consent to extend military and financial assistance to Greece and Turkey. This speech is regarded as the first big proclamation in quite some time in Cold War international debate and is thus treated seriously as the Cold War's authoritative proclamation.

It might be argued that the Truman Convention was a result of the American geostrategic and international perception of Greece and Turkey as major country states in terms of security in the Middle East, and vital to the protection of American public interests in the Mediterranean region. It systematized the disparities between the United States and the Soviet Union; Truman, like a typical geopolitician, used the simple and conceptual categories of "the free globe" and "the subjugated world," which is extremely opposing thinking. His foreign understanding divided the world into two camps: good vs evil, free capitalism versus socialism, the West versus the East, and the United States versus the Soviet Union.

Greece was important to Truman and Turkey had become crucial because "the failure of the West to prevent a socialist takeover in Greece would not only position the Russians on an exceptionally perilous flank for the Turks but also increase the Soviet Association's power to withdraw unified supplies and aid with the occasion of war." It might be argued that the threat of territorial cascade influence influenced the US' decision.

The Truman Convention may be considered one of the most important steps in the United States Cold War control policy, and it was implemented by financial restitution of Western Europe via the Marshall Plan and military regulation with the establishment of NATO in 1949. As a result, following President Truman's speech before Congress, worldwide dialogue on the US began to be formed, and these efforts legitimized US mediation efforts all over the world. The study, known as the Public Safety Chamber Goal (NSC)- 68 and published in 1950, is one of the fundamental documents establishing the United States Cold War foreign rhetoric.

According to the study, "[t]he onslaught on free organizations is widespread now, and given the current polarization of force, a loss of free institutions anywhere is a loss everywhere." The worldwide repercussions of this argument include that all parts of the globe have equal important importance, and so a world leader must declare expertise in all nations. The Soviet framework was viewed as opposed to the US framework and an impediment to the foundation of request in the global framework. The record characterized the US's worldwide role as a world leader as follows: "Our broad policy right now may be portrayed as one meant to create a global atmosphere in which the American framework may make due and thrive."

It consequently rejects the concept of confinement and emphasizes the importance of our constructive support for the global society."  Similarly, this American framework would have to establish global international rules. Its main adversary was described as the Soviet Association and its allies as the nations backing "free foundations."

The Truman Tenet, Marshall Plan, and NSC-68 reports resulted in billions of dollars in monetary and military aid for Western Europe, as well as Greece and Turkey. With these agreements, the US organization demonstrated to the world that it had taken over England's role in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. The essential elements remaining to be resolved were Greece's and Turkey's tactical roles in the Marshall Plan and eventually in NATO the geostrategic framework's force.

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, and NATO was established. It was regarded as a fulfillment of the international appeal for the Cold War. Turkey asked for membership in NATO in May 1950 but was denied, mostly because of its location in the international eyes of the United States and England. According to them, "Turkey did not have a place with either Western Europe or the Atlantic, and hence she was unable to join the Atlantic provincial group."

In any case, as Altunşk and Tür emphasize, the State Division was concerned about a potential Turkish-Soviet rapprochement because, while the US military was not ready to expand its institutional responsibilities in the Mediterranean district, the State Division was concerned about a potential Turkish-Soviet rapprochement because of Turkey's exclusion from NATO; because to political and geological considerations, Turkey's admission to NATO was linked to Greece's admission. According to a US State Department study dated June 13, 1949, "the loss of Turkey would fundamentally impact US security objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East." The reminder states that "[i]t would be ludicrous to include Turkey if Greece were not included."

Following Turkey's rejection by the United States and the United Kingdom for membership in NATO, Turkish leaders gradually began to emphasize Turkey's international relevance in contrast to the Soviet Union and express concerns about the country's security. These early efforts to change the choice had an impact on Americans and English, but Turkey was given another chance when the Korean War started on June 25, 1950, and NATO was present. Turkey reapplied to NATO on August 11, 1950 , and on October 18, 1950, it committed 4,500 troops to Korea to bolster its application.

Following the Korean War, it is evident that the Western Coalition would require Greece and Turkey in the event of a battle with the Eastern Coalition. Acheson reminded the Europeans at the North Atlantic Committee meeting in September 1951 that Turkish and Greek involvement would be the best approach to strengthen the alliance. Eventually, despite opposition from England and the Scandinavian nations, and as a result of the favorable status, Turkish soldiers gained in the Korean War, coupled with a shift in American perceptions about Turkey's critical relevance after 1951, Turkey became a NATO member on February 18, 1952, a NATO member was killed. Turkey's international role in the alliance was to prevent Soviet expansionism by acting as NATO's southern flank.

Turkey became an important partner in the Korean War, as well as an example of how beneficial US international strategy might be in 'controlling' the Soviets. Turkey's acceptance into NATO was viewed as another duty for the country, both militarily and politically, and socially.

The Middle East, according to George Harris, "was an important testing ground for the Turkish-American alliance in the first 10 years of Turkey's involvement in NATO."During the Cold War years, the US as a global force had a few foreign goals. For example, it intended to deter a future Soviet attack in the area, secure NATO's southern flank, assist Israel, and maintain western stock lines across the Mediterranean, as well as access and control oil in the Middle East. Even though Turkey's major role in the alliance was to entice the Soviet Union, Ankara also played an important role in the strategy to preserve Western interests in the Middle East. In actuality, Turkey strengthened the district, which was crucial to US interests, and provided a significant gateway to the Middle East.