Congress authorizes the Department of Defense and the United States Department of State to collaborate with other countries to direct certain types of exercises that come under the protection of safety partnerships. These exercises vary from arms transactions and military exercises to educational courses and faculty trades. Every year, the United States spends billions of dollars and collaborates with a large number of unfamiliar understudies and learners on US security collaboration endeavors, which include a large number of well-trained and secure military individuals, US government regular citizens, and workers for hire who plan, execute, screen, and assess these endeavors. Sometimes partner countries reserve the exercises, while in other circumstances, the US finances them as advances and rewards.

As previously stated, we gathered data on the types of safety involvement activities presented in Chapter One. Reference section A comprises seven figures that present a fraction of the findings, focusing mostly on data from 2013 to 2018. The figures specifically show how much funding or the number of unfamiliar faculty members are involved in general US military guidance, military limit building programs, arms deals and moves, instruction and preparation programs, HA/DR exercises, institutional limit building projects, and access-related arrangements.

Nonetheless, it is critical to recognize that the Department of Defense does not exhaustively collect or investigate US security collaboration commitment. As previously stated, there is no single data collection of exercises or standardized technique for tracking subsidization or assistance across programs.

The majority of data related to security involvement is tracked in bits and pieces throughout workplaces and administrations, with each employing distinct estimating procedures at various stages.

Occasionally, different workplaces or organizations produce numbers for a comparable class of safety collaboration activity such as military actions that rely on different definitions or assumptions and hence do not coordinate. As a result, we confront a barrier of faulty data while assessing the security collaboration exercises or even the United States, for which abundant unclassified material is available.

The USAF adds to the challenge of acquiring and interpreting US government data on security engagement efforts. There are organizations (such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency) inside the DoD and the Department of State that share data for executive, oversight, and detailed functions. In any event, there is no centralized repository of USAF data throughout the security participation effort, and locating information on USAF security cooperation initiatives is unusually difficult.

Security engagement is seldom tracked on a help level, and the USAF in particular does not measure its commitment. Any collection effort should refer to specific units or associations, and in some cases, specific persons, to obtain information on their security collaboration activities. Because these organizations are not required to collect identical information or track it over time, there are challenges with comparing data among comparative associations.

Despite the little information available, a few broad trends and subjects may be identified. Because of the United States, these concerns are not global, but rather parochial. The main objectives and continuing patterns in US security participation exercises should be determined in this manner in their provincial context.

The majority of security assistance is directed toward the Middle East and Afghanistan, for example, while arms deals and transfers are concentrated in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, where the USAF focuses a significant portion of its specialized preparation efforts, and in further developed partners in Europe and Asia. The emphasis in Europe, where the USAF devotes a substantial portion of its flight preparation and military personnel skills, is on engaging in actions and creating regular capacity to deter Russia. In the Pacific, position and presence are important, and there is a greater emphasis on innovation and collaboration with close partners to compete with China.

In Africa, security involvement efforts concentrate on working on institutional limits, providing education, and preparing for peacekeeping deployments. It is possible to get a better idea of the size and scope of the United States by looking at security collaboration from a local perspective. The exercises and the different methods in which the US brings in unfamiliar collaborators are all not typically obvious in the overall figures.

The United States security cooperation in Central Asia and the Middle East is centered on ongoing military operations and traditional diplomatic objectives. Throughout the review period, assistance for Operations Resolute Support and Inherent Resolve remained a major focus of US security involvement activity. Nations in the United States Central Command's (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) received 60% of all US security assistance, the majority of which consisted of continuing assistance to Afghanistan ($4 billion per year) and assistance to Iraqi and Syrian resistance forces participating in the mission to defeat the Islamic State ($1.4 billion per year).

Throughout the research, the United States' efforts to develop and prepare partner capabilities to oppose psychological oppression and extreme radicalism constituted an increase in subsidies. It is also crucial to recognize that the FMF program commits a significant portion of US assistance to Egypt ($1.3 billion per year) as a result of its assistance for the Middle East ceasefire, as well as Jordan ($440 million per year), which is the third-largest beneficiary of FMF. Israel, which is crucial for US European Command's (EUCOM) AOR, also receives $3.6 billion in assistance each year, and this large sum makes Israel an outlier. These figures place a premium on US assistance in the Middle East.

Top-tier acquisitions by GCC governments, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, dominate arms and equipment deals in the Middle East. Between 2014 and 2018, Saudi Arabia alone spent more than $12 billion on US armaments. Qatar was a large buyer of American aircraft, including a $6 billion deal for the F-15QA combat plane. These agreements dwarf FMS program approvals to Iraq ($2.7 billion) and Egypt ($1.9 billion), both of which were supported by US reserves. Afghanistan is the primary benefactor in terms of education and training; the Afghan Security Forces Fund funds 48 percent of all professors in the region.

However, Saudi Arabia is the primary beneficiary of FMS-subsidized training (11 percent of all training in the area) and receives a high level of USAF specialty training globally. In light of evolving possibilities, the United States does not participate strongly in local practices. The Indo-Pacific Region's Security Cooperation Priorities Focus on Highly Capable Allies Building accomplice limit isn't as obvious in that frame of mind as it appears to be in the Middle East or Central Asia because US security cooperation ventures in the region primarily comprise extremely capable allies.

When we examined the available data from 2014 to 2018, we discovered that the region received only 2% of total US security assistance, with the majority of that assistance going to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The implementation of the Asia Reassurance Initiative, which includes up to $1.5 billion every year allocated to building limits in the region, may cause the Pacific's level of US assistance to rise gradually beginning in 2019.